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COMMENT
A COMl\1ENT ON THE SUPPOSED PARADOXES OF A
MATHEMATICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF
TRIALSt
DALE

A.

NANCE*

This symposium has renewed discussion of the apparent paradox of attempting to apply mathematical probabilities to the logic of trials. Brought to
academic attention by the stimulating work of L. Jonathan Cohen/ the
debate reflects a more general controversy over the virtues of quantifying
legal decisionmaking. In this b1ief comment I do not intend to take sides
either in this debate or in the more general controversy. I want only to draw
attention to a weakness in the legal interpretations which underlie much of
the debate.
The paradoxes that Cohen identified can, for the most part, be subsumed
under the following proposition: If one hypothesizes that the rules applicable
to mathematical probability2 apply to the logic of legal inference, then one is
led to prescribe results for identifiable situations that are inconsistent with
the established legal rules governing them. Thus, the hypothesis that mathematical probability applies in this way must be mistaken, at least in some
contexts and as a descriptive matter. Cohen then gives an account of probabilistic reasoning that he claims is more compatible with juristic reasoning.
There are three distinguishable steps in the kind of argument that Cohen
has employed. First, one must accurately identify the prescribed results of
applying mathematical probability to the designated situations. Second, one
must accurately identify the established legal rules on the relevant issues.
Finally, of course, one must compare the identified results with the legal
rules, and show the two to be inconsistent. I believe that at least the second
step in this process has been defectively performed with respect to each
supposedly paradoxical situation that Cohen identifies. Since the second
step in the analysis is essentially a matter of legal research and interpretation, it is perhaps not surprising that Cohen, who is not a lawyer, may have
been misled by the legal authorities upon which he has relied. It is regrettat © 1986 by Dale A. Nance.
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Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
2 It is clear from the debates that what is meant by "mathematical probability" is a
system of probability measurement that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms. See, e.g.,
id. at § 2; Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A
Response to Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 636-41. See generally
T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY 58-60 (1973).
1
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ble, however, that academic lawyers who have joined in the debate have
failed to utilize their special skills to investigate the purely legal issues more
thoroughly.
Perhaps my point can be seen best in the context of the supposed difficulty
about conjunction. 3 In its simplest form, the claim of paradox here rurrs as
follows. 4 Assume a simple civil case in which there are two essential elements in the plaintiff's cause of action, A and B, and no complicating
affirmative defenses or counterclaims. The proper mathematical interpretation of the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases, we are
told, is that the probability of the event to be proved must be greater than .5.
Therefore, a mathematical interpretation of the plaintiff's burden is that the
plaintiff should win if, and only if, the probability that both A and B are true
is greater than .5. That is to say, if Pr is the probability function, which is
taken to satisfy the mathematical calculus of chances:
P wins if and only if Pr(A and B) is greater than .5.
(Criterion D
However, we are told that this is not equivalent to the established legal
standard. Rather, we are told, the legal standard is that the plaintiff wins if
and only if each element is severally proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accepting the mathematical interpretation of the preponderance
of the evidence standard, this would have to mean:
P wins if and only if Pr(A) is greater than .5
and Pr(B) is greater than .5.
(Criterion ID
It is clear that (I) and (II) are not equivalent criteria, and the hypothesis has

generated a contradiction. A typical, though obviously unrealistic, example
of the difference between the two standards is to assume A and B are
probabilistically independent and that Pr(A) = .6 and Pr(B) = .6. Then,
under the multiplicative rule of mathematical probabilities, Pr(A and B) =
3

A few comments along the lines of the point made here have appeared in this
symposium regarding another supposed paradox, that concerning the mathematical
analysis of negation, as it arises in the context of the gatecrasher problem. See Allen,
A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. REv. 401,405-06 (1986); see also
Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp., 288 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. App. 1979). With regard to the
problem of catenated inferences, see J. WpiNSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS, M.
BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 32-35 n.5 (7th ed. 1983).
4
See Cohen, supra note I, at ch. 5. Actually, Cohen considers several possible
mathematical interpretations of the civil standard of proof, but in each case-including the main one discussed here-he claims that the mathematicist is embarrassed by
the consequences of his approach. One important possibility that he does not consider is that "preponderance" might have a context-dependent, but nonetheless
quantitative, measure.
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Pr(A) x Pr(B)
.36, so that the plaintiff loses under Criterion I but wins
under Criterion II. More realistic assumptions can generate similar problems, or at least so it is claimed.
The problem I want to point out concerns the claim that the established
legal standard is the plaintiff wins if and only if each element is severally
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In particular, the issue is the
accuracy of the claim that, in the determination of facts, the law concerns
itself only with the probabilistic evaluation of the elements seriatim, and
not with the probabilistic evaluation of their conjunction.5 I have not undertaken an exhaustive study of the authoritative interpretations of the burden
of persuasion in this regard, but what I have found is peculiarly unhelpful.
Cohen himself simply says, without citing legal authority, that "[t]he rule for
civil suits requires a plaintiff to prove each element of his case on the balance
of probability," and that a conjunction rule, with its multiplicative consequence under mathematical probabilities, "seems to be a rule that is unknown to judges and unrespected by triers of fact.' ' 6
One obvious place to look for guidance on this issue is jury instructions. A
typical example, cited by one writer who accepts that there is a paradox
here/ is the following instruction patterned for use in federal civil cases:
The burden is on the plaintiff in a civil action, such as this, to prove
every essential element of his claim by a preponderance ofthe evidence.
If the proof should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff's
claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, the jury should
find for the defendant. 8
This instruction is subject to a variety of interpretations. In particular,
lawyers (reputation notwithstanding) are sloppy enough in the use of language that "every" in the first sentence could mean "all" or it could mean
"each. " 9 The former interpretation makes more palpable an affinity to
Criterion I; the latter looks more like Criterion II. The ultimate difficulty,
however, is that, whichever word one substitutes, the denotation of conjunc-

5

Cohen's explanation would be that because the law embraces his system of
"inductive" probability it ought not to concern itself directly with a conjunctive
probability. Under Cohen's system, the probability of the conjunction of two events
either is meaningless or, where meaningful, is equal to the smallest of the probabilites
of the individual elements. In the latter case, an inductive probability version of
Criterion I is equivalent to an inductive probability version of Criterion II, and
contradiction is thus avoided. See COHEN, supra note 1, at§ 71.
6
Jd. at 58, 59. Elsewhere Cohen provides numerous citations to legal authorities,
see id. at ch. 4 (entitled "What are the Standards of Proof in Courts of Law?"), but
none specifically on the point of the conjunction problem or the multiplication rule.
7
Allen, supra note 3, at 405.
8
E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 71.14 (3d ed. 1977).
9
See, e.g., BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 498 (5th ed. 1979).
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tion in these terms is inexactly specified. It is not clear where the "and" is to
be placed, within the functional parentheses, as in Criterion I, or outside of
them, as in Criterion II.
In either case, it seems to be contemplated in the model instruction that
the first sentence logically entails the second, and that the second separately
states certain necessary conditions for the plaintiff to win. As the second
sentence contains (logicians would say) no new information, the purpose of
the second sentence seems to be simply to remind the jury that a failure by
the plaintiff to sufficiently prove any element of the plaintiff's case will
relieve the jury of further deliberations on the other elements. 10 But is such
an interpretation of the second sentence really consistent with the mathematicist's preferred Criterion I? The answer is yes, for the simple reason that
under mathematical probabilities, the probability of any conjunctive event
can be no greater than that of any constituent event by itself. If, therefore,
Pr(A) were to be estimated with reasonable confidence by the jury as less
than .5, it would necessarily follow under a mathematicist interpretation that
Pr(A and B) is less than .5, and the defendant should win without the
necessity of considering or determining Pr(B) .u What does not follow, of
course, is that the jury is properly instructed to give a verdict for the plaintiff
if they find only that the probability of each element in the plaintiff's claim
exceeds .5. Stated formally, the simultaneous satisfaction of each condition in a set of necessary conditions is not necessarily a sufficient condition.
It may not be too surprising, however, that some people talk as if it were.
Indeed, even knowledgeable participants in this debate argue that the specification of necessary conditions in such a jury instruction is inconsistent
with a mathematicist interpretation: they infer that the collective satisfaction
of each of the necessary conditions should be sufficient to give the verdict
for the plaintiff. 12
·
Obviously, such a simple analysis is just the beginning of a thorough
interpretation of provisions like the quoted jury instruction. Much more can
and should be said by anyone claiming that there is an established legal mle
as to the exact application of the civil standard to multiple elements of a
claim. (I would suggest some serious research into the use of special verdicts
and interrogatories to the jury.) Here, I will only indicate a little further just
how a mathematicist interpretation is reasonably plausible in this contextY
This interpretation is confirmed by other jury instructions. See, e.g., E. DEVITT
BLACKMAR, supra note 8, at§§ 74.05, 74.06.
11 Of course, Cohen's "inductive" probabilities would allow an analogous interpretation of the relationship between the second sentence of the instruction and the
first. See L. CoHEN, supra note 1, at § 7!.
11 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 405-06.
13 To date, defenses of the plausibility of a mathematicist interpretation have been
developed primarily in the context of the gatecrasher paradox. See Kaye, The
Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 101; Cohen,
Subjective Probability and tlze Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627;
10
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The results of my informal survey of jury instructions shows that, on their
face, most instructions are at least as ambiguous as the one discussed above.
For example, reflect for a moment upon the following instruction for a
simple negligence case:
In order to prove the essential elements of plaintiff's claim, the burden
is on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence in the
case, the following facts: First, that the defendant was negligent in one
or more of the particulars alleged; and second, that the defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause of some injury and consequent damage sustained by the plaintiff. 14
The ambiguities here are legion and obvious, though this instruction is
somewhat more amenable to a mathematicist interpretation. Still, it is likely
that lawyers do not appreciate these ambiguities. One should, therefore,
consider such instructions skeptically, at least when considering which
underlying theory of probability they confirm. While it is sometimes appropriate to assume that legal pronouncements carry subtle, even undiscovered,
wisdom-or, as Cohen would have it, the wisdom of much everyday probabilistic reasoning-it is also sometimes true that those pronouncements
simply lack logical sophistication. 15
This is not to say that judges, or for that matter lay jurors or lawyers, have
intuitions regarding the probabilistic evaluation of evidence that are largely
erroneous. It is not at all uncommon to have reasonably correct intuitions
but to be unable to explain them. It would not surprise me if the typical trier
of fact, whether judge or jury, faced with the kind of situation described
earlier (e.g., Pr{A) = .6, Pr(B) = .6, A and B independent) would find for the
defendant, especially if any applicable jury instructions authorize such a
result or are at all ambiguous on the matter. 16 On the other hand, it would be
Kaye, supra note 2; see also Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the
Process of Proof, 66 B.U.L. REv. 439 (1986).
14
E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 8, at§ 80.17. See a/so id. at§§ 80.23,
82.02, 83.02, 84.03, 84.15, 90.21, 90.22, 90.26, 90.27, 90.34, 92.05.
15
To corroborate this point, I want to reporf one of my experiences in going from
an undergraduate education heavy in abstract mathematics to the rhetorical exercise
of law school. J quickly found that lawyers had a propensity to infer the converse of
an authoritative proposition, or not to infer it, in what seemed to be a random
manner. A little later I realized that it was not random at all: the use of the inference
was highly correlated with whether it got the speaker where she wanted to go. Of
course, the logical error of inferring a proposition from (only) its converse is closely
related to the confusion of necessity conditions and sufficiency conditions.
16
Nor would it be surprising, however, if the case were found for the plaintiff,
since ordinary people exercising intuitive judgment tend to overestimate the mathematical probability of the occurrence of conjunctive events, at least where the
component events are probabilistically independent. See Saks & Kidd, Human
Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'y
REV. 123, 142 (1980-81).
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surprising to me if the trier were able to articulate its decision by reference to
a rule as precise as Criterion I and to differentiate that from Criterion II.
Such decisions by the trier of fact would help to render unnecessary the
clarification of ambiguous instructions. Moreover, if such a decision were to
arise in the context of a general verdict accompanied by interrogatories, the
judge might well be obligated to assume a mathematicist interpretation in
order to make the jury's answers to the interrogatories consistent with their
general verdictY
Of course, nothing about the argument presented here presupposes that
mathematical probability is applicable to the logic of trials. That is an
interesting and important issue which deserves all the discussion it is getting.
Nevertheless, my tentative conclusion is that the relevant rules of law are
ambiguous and thus do not supply much support for either position. Perhaps further research will require modification or abandonment of this conclusion. But if it is correct, then the debate should be pursued on grounds
other than the relative compatibility of the contending theories with the
established rules of law. Instead, each theory might better be used in the
prescriptive enterprises of law reform and interpretation.

17

See J.

FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE

& A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 533 (1985).

